

FRONTLINE

8-31-09
early AM

Separate — though related, interesting —
degrees of the DM/SIOP

Deputy Machine

that

1) — I demand, reported

sees

2) are still true today, in US
in new NWS

3) some of which still true in US
and/or R

(these dangers are not only as ~~are~~
enough to prove,

but degrees to harm, in
themselves (with no further proof!)

I: Scale, cities (as per 2nd strike, noted)
("Revenge" — (bill SB, in hurry,
Japan)
on very scale

Dead Hand
low

II Delegation (vs. "dead"
(Kernson) Japan starts 1958

III Decap (vs. End of War: Tokyo/Emperor
What if: "1" "bits

2) Kyoto?

X

3) NO SU entry, no
offer to Emperor

(Admission/Markings

(Plan) civil on Radio, Targets?

IV False alarms (on alerts)

V Cities as targets (Type I Dist.
(assuming SU ~~Options~~)
could disarm
most of force;
and no 2nd strikes
D-L

VI D-L of FS,
(AWM) or penetration 1st vs. 2nd strikes
AWW

(still in US/R plans: see by Cruise Analysis
Plans for new states) Polaris Hunt

VII addressed to Type II Dist

~~VIII~~ and backing up FU (later: FU threats)

~~IX~~ C³ Vulnerability

US "empire"
indirect
informal
"free trade"
(for others)

(open door —
for US corps)

Multilateral Trade

Rosenthal
Fountain

REFS:

SIOP Clearance

McG - C-II

McG - on DE, FRUS

Finger on the Button

Pro Ball - 1961

Rosenthal

Errol Kaplan

Shubert - DE & SIOP

X-5SM-3

LEON SLOSS (Alvin? call.)

Edlton, Trinkl, McHorney

Nikun, Cragg, Kent, SAC

BUTLER

✓ 6-13-09

Anal Project
to MGE

~~PK~~ ✓ KPW
✓ TR! ✓ RBE
✓ BK

Franklin? ✓ (May?) ✓ Ethel
Scherer? ✓ PDS? ✓ Member
Cody? ✓ (VMM) ✓ Cabasso
Bergman? ✓ Marshall ✓ Smith
Hend? ✓

✓ Andy Ross? ✓ PK ✓ Holabird
✓ LBO ✓ Koller

Eventually: begin ✓ Wilkes
after dialog group

call Burt, Marshall

2/29/08 8:14 AM

A-nuc book/proliferation/reflections

Contrary to the declaratory policy of nine presidents—every one from Eisenhower on—over fifty-six years:

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has never, at any time, been one of the highest priorities of the USG.

Indeed, it has never been a high priority. It is commonly surpassed by any one of a number of other considerations, themselves not especially high priorities or more than transient objectives. That is, when opposing proliferation comes in conflict with one of these many other aims of the moment, which is frequently, it is neglected or contradicted in favor of the other pursuits.

Aside from frequent, misleading assertions of great or supreme concern to avert proliferation, action-policies or actual actions that inhibit or block proliferation are occasional, selective and discriminatory, inconsistent, discontinuous, often contradictory. On the other hand, policies and actions (and inactions) that actually promote, encourage or enable proliferation are continuous and powerful. On balance, the overall effect of U.S. posture and policy has been on the side of *promoting* proliferation, making at least some proliferation inevitable and (so long as these policies persist) irreversible.

The thrust of US policy has not been to *maximize* the rate and scale of proliferation (even among regimes friendly to the US) and so far the spread has been less than it might have been and, indeed, was widely expected to be. This is (only) partly due to the inconsistencies in US policy and the actual measures and pressures it has applied to slow it or make it selective. But for a number of reasons, this slow expansion of the number of nuclear states may well be at a “tipping” point, at which it accelerates sharply. The continuation and, under GWB, amplification of the long-term USG action-policies and attitudes that have promoted proliferation is one essential reason for this.

It may well be that nothing short of a radical shift in U.S. priorities and nuclear posture can arrest movement in the relatively short run beyond this tipping point into what has been called “a nuclear armed crowd,” in which abolition of nuclear weapons will appear infeasible in the indefinite future even to those who have advocated it as a practical aim up until now, and in which actual nuclear attacks, not only threats, become a regular part of human experience.

Most of the propositions above (even the last one, with respect to the USG contribution to the prospect of expanded proliferation) are unfamiliar to the general public. The factual bases for them have in large part been kept effectively secret even from specialists in arms control, including many who have worked at high levels in the government. A gap between declaratory policy and actual operating action-policy is common in government; that is the point of making the conceptual distinction. But the magnitude of the gap is not often as extreme as in this case: to the point of rendering the declared policy, in this case non-proliferation, effectively a hoax, a deliberate fraud.

The situation is not unique. A very comparable case is the declaration over the same period that the USG puts very high priority on, or even favors, achieving or maintaining democracy in the Third World. Similarly, a "war on drugs" is effectively a hoax. Even a "war on terrorism" *per se*.

In any of these cases, it is obvious that *if there were*, as claimed and generally believed, a clear, coherent governmental *intention* and *desire* to eliminate and avert, across the board, all proliferation, or despotism, or drugs, or terrorism, it has so far fallen very short of complete success, or perhaps even progress. But it is generally supposed that this reflects the difficulty of the problem, the obstacles and organized opposition external to the U.S. government itself, the limits on its power and perhaps, understanding.

I am asserting something different. To focus on proliferation (similar things could be said for each of the other cases above) , I am saying that the operative attitude at the highest levels of the U.S. government toward the declared aim or averting *any and all* proliferation has been, at best, ambivalent, or even negative. This fact is in itself a well-kept secret, a flat contradiction of assertions in each administration that USG opposition to proliferation is in all cases unified and urgent.

At least two opposed schools of thought have been represented virtually continuously in every administration, one being close to the declared, public position, the other either rejecting in principle the publicly-declared generalized opposition to proliferation or rejecting it as an effective priority in particular cases. Ironically, one might say, it is the latter attitude, contradicting the asserted policy that the public takes for granted, that has commonly won out. That is not true in every instance, or continuously; hence there is an inconsistent, on-off, curiously selective appearance to U.S. policy that is either simply puzzling to observers or attributed to systemic incompetence or the inattentiveness of high-level officials, rather than to sharp and high-level internal conflict, either among officials or between the declared policy and real intentions.

The USG has frequently failed to do things it could easily have done to discourage or prevent proliferation: even, sometimes, when it is legally obliged to do so. Second, much more than almost anyone knows, high-level officials have acted secretly to conceal, protect and thus enable proliferation activities and programs of other states that an informed U.S. Congress, public, or world opinion might well have acted to curtail.

Above all, there has frequently been awareness among high officials that dominant U.S. nuclear policies both promote proliferation and even make it inevitable in the long run, along with argument in secret councils that for that reason these policies should, in the interests of the U.S. and even of human survival, should be quickly and radically reversed. Yet the existence of these attitudes and this debate among officials has been effectively been kept secret over half a century, while this policy strain has been continuously overridden. That is to say that its adherents have consented continuously to be muzzled with respect to public discussion while they have been defeated in their every attempt internally to change the reigning policies radically or to reverse them.

Perhaps what encourages them both to keep trying and to consent to silence about the conflict (apart from the fact that the silence is a condition of keeping their jobs, which they can't stand the thought of losing) is that they do achieve occasional successes in stopping, slowing or moderating strongly-promoted programs that would *accelerate* the arms race or the dangers of nuclear annihilation (e.g., a vast ABM program, a much larger MX deployment, a failure to stop or, now, a renewal of nuclear testing). Herbert York, first director of Livermore Nuclear Weapons Lab, titled his book on the dominant contribution of U.S. nuclear weapons policy to the nuclear arms race, "*Race to Oblivion*." The contribution of the "silent doves" in successive administrations who have taken seriously the objective of averting nuclear extinction has been, only, to moderate, to slow the pace of the race toward an abyss.

3/1/08 7:33 PM

The algebra of proliferation

Axiom: If it is legitimate for n (> 0) nations to possess nuclear weapons, then it is legitimate for $n + 1$.

This is recognized not only by prospective “next” nuclear weapons states, but by the dominant decision-makers in the U.S., contrary to their efforts to proclaim that it is somehow illegitimate for any new nations to join the club though legitimate for current NWS to maintain their arsenals indefinitely.

It is simply absurd to talk about an existing, operative “norm” against proliferation. It is, indeed, generally seen as undesirable if “everybody” gets nuclear weapons, or even if a sizeable number of new nuclear weapons states are added to the current ones, but that does not translate into a feeling by almost anyone that it is immoral or illegitimate for a given NNWS (non-nuclear weapons state) to aspire to change its status, or to do so by giving the legal three-months notice of intent to leave the NPT followed by a weapons program. To the extent it violates its NPT obligations (as, of course, the US has always done with respect to Article VI) it is subject to condemnation and sanctions (which none of the violators of Article VI have encountered), and the charge that its actions are destabilizing by encouraging imitation. But that charge can be made, with full validity, of the programs of each of the current NWS in turn, starting with the US. There is no basis for holding any new NWS more accountable for its destabilizing effects than any of its predecessors.

A new consideration is the possibility that a state will actually sell nuclear technology, information, materials or even complete weapons to the highest bidder. Pakistan’s actual practice of doing this is at best a precedent for pushing proliferation past a tipping point. At worst, it may already have secretly spread the seeds of irreversible, widespread proliferation (beyond its known customers of Iran, North Korea and Libya). And another possibility is that a new state will provide a non-state terrorist group with nuclear capabilities. This is the charge made by the Bush administration against Iraq (with no basis in reality) and now against Iran. Both charges were implausible at best. But the possibility is there, as the real case of Pakistan (with actual institutional ties to the Taliban, if not to Al Qaeda, and a record of irresponsible sales) illustrates.

Yet the novelty of these contingencies is undercut by the secret history of help by nuclear states including the US to others seeking weapons, even though this has not been a matter of “sale to the highest bidder.” France and Britain aided Israel; Israel worked with South Africa; China helped Pakistan and Iran; Britain helped India; the US may have helped France (my own experience bears on this), possibly Israel, possibly India (again, I have experience bearing on this), and Pakistan: in all these latter cases, the US withheld its knowledge of the others’ programs from agencies or Congress that might have obstructed them.

Though Harry Truman, and possibly General Groves, believed that the US could maintain a monopoly of atomic weapons for the indefinite future, or at least for a prolonged period, this was simple ignorance. The physicists understood in 1945 that $n=1$ was unstable, that an expansion to 2 awaited only four or five years, with the likelihood, in the absence of heroic measures of international control, of many more eventually. But even when the monopoly was broken, on time, in 1949, US leaders shifted to a determination to maintain "superiority" into the indefinite future. And that policy has persisted unbroken for the next fifty-nine years.

Along with the actual repeated use of US weapons, by threats in crises, and the structuring of core US policies in Europe and elsewhere on the explicit readiness to initiate and wage nuclear war, that policy has *precluded* the emergence, ever, of a *norm* against proliferation, even though the treaty obligations under the NPT have so far prevented widespread decisions to acquire actual weapons. And without such a norm, generally accepted and strongly held, it is hard to imagine the universal acceptance of the intrusive inspections and sanctions that would be necessary actually to block the capability for further proliferation.

Int 1969 SIO briefing UN-REDACTED

[Resuscitate FOIA]

Look at what I've written

What was still doing? (C-II...)

My 69-73 intention: efforts to release

Int. Sec.?
article

SecDef Truman "declassif"?

(see 45r
Ball
Kaplan
Freedman?)

Delegation does

SIO does

Rosenberg
Ball

(Kuderman?)


KAPLAN

V
NESC-2009

(Kaplan?)

GEOP/PACOM notes (Pacific Kadi)

MP-II files (TR-boxes)



YES (Mues)

FU NEU

policy

cases

Wang on prof. NSA's

C-II → war

(Risks)

breakin
Princeton

Delegation (Pakistan others

Def of SW/
JSCP

Rue Winter

600M "option" 1969
(90 - 120 M.)

NSSM-3

Halden

/
effect on Planners

get declassified

(My guidance

BAS published?

+ Robinson's

Annals New Yorker?

Remick?

Hemp's

Hirsch (And to reverse Bush policies

Exhort Franklin Miller

Int. Review for Rifter Conference (PK)

Wednesday, June 10, 2009
8:37 AM

\\ANF\Proposal 09\Frontline.3

What I knew in the Sixties, and what is almost surely true today:

What Frontline should expose, via its own investigation and by stimulating Congressional hearings:

--Strategic nuclear US options were/are operationally at the ready to destroy hundreds of cities simultaneously, killing hundreds of millions, or billions, of people by blast, fire and radioactive fallout.

(I was instrumental in revealing this to President Kennedy, in the course of my revising radically the Eisenhower-era top guidance to the operational nuclear war plans for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Nevertheless, such options have always remained current in operational plans.)

Past Congressional inquiries on projected targeting and effects have been thwarted. Frontline should bring to the attention of the public and Congress our possible complicity in multi-genocide (on the order of hundreds of Holocausts) and (see below) in risking human extinction.

--The clouds of soot and smoke from the simultaneous burning of hundreds of cities, if this option were executed, would block sunlight for a prolonged period in the northern hemisphere, and possibly around the globe, causing "nuclear winter." Recent scientific studies have confirmed that an attack in spring or summer would freeze lakes and rivers and destroy all crops, bringing mass starvation and the destruction of civilization in the northern hemisphere and possibly worldwide, and possible near- or total human extinction.

The Obama administration is reportedly aiming at reducing the number of deployed, operational US and Russian warheads to 1500 (from 1700 to 2200) each and possibly down to 1000 each. But 1000 warheads are still capable of causing nuclear winter, the worldwide destruction of civilization and possibly of humanity. There should not exist on earth one, let alone two, "nuclear winter machines." This points to the urgent necessity of reducing, in the short run, operational nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia to well below one thousand total for both.

Moreover, recent scientific studies conclude that even a very much smaller nuclear exchange involving as few as one hundred Hiroshima-sized explosions—such as could occur between India and Pakistan—could have prolonged effects on the ozone layer that protects the earth from ultraviolet radiation, with devastating effects on health and crops, as well as climatic effects greater than any in recorded history. This implies that even the smallest nuclear arsenals—at the level of fifty rather than a thousand-- are larger than can

be justified to the world at large in terms of their possible or likely effects on the world community.

--There were, and almost surely are, a great many American fingers on a number of nuclear buttons distributed around the world in American nuclear commands. The well-known image of the presidential "football"—the briefcase that always accompanies the president containing codes for executing various nuclear options—is meant to convey that only the president can launch nuclear attacks. That is a hoax.

Every president since Eisenhower has delegated authority to launch nuclear operations to nuclear-capable theater commanders under certain conditions, such as inability to communicate with Washington during a crisis or presidential incapacitation (like Eisenhower's heart attack and stroke). (I revealed this to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's Assistant for National Security, in the first month of his administration; only recently have documents confirming this for Eisenhower and Kennedy been declassified, and the situation, which persists, is still largely unknown to the public.)

It is essential, of course, that it be known to the Russians and others that they cannot paralyze American nuclear retaliation by a single warhead on Washington. (For the same reason, the Russians have made similar arrangements: as have, almost certainly, the Pakistanis and every other nuclear weapons state). But this delegation has been, until very recently, one of our most sensitively protected secrets from the American people, lest they be, for good reason, concerned that nuclear war might occur by the authorized but mistaken decision of one or another of many officials below the level of the president. This justified concern would be an addition to the real and also under-investigated dangers (another of my past professional subjects) of false alarms, accidents and unauthorized actions.

Past Congressional hearings have been misled by official testimony on existence of delegation. Frontline should seek current answers, both by exploring possible sources and by stimulating new Congressional demands for truthful testimony on how many fingers are on buttons, whose they are, and what can be known about the probable situation in other nuclear weapons states, in particular Russia, Pakistan, India, North Korea and Israel.

--It is a widespread misconception that no nuclear weapons have been used since Nagasaki. US presidents have used them dozens of times, in confrontations—in the exact same sense that a gun is being used when it is pointed at someone's head, whether or not the trigger is pulled. It is a myth that the use of nuclear weapons in circumstances other than nuclear attack on the US or its forces has been "unthinkable" in the Oval Office.

On the contrary, every president since Truman has had occasion, usually in secret from the American public, sometimes but not always bluffing, to threaten or to entertain consideration of possible imminent initiation of nuclear attack in a confrontation. That

continues into the present, with not only the president but every major presidential candidate last year emphasizing that “all options are on the table” with respect to Iran (in context with leaks that Vice President Cheney had directed the readiness of nuclear operations against Iranian underground sites and other targets).

This largely-unknown long pattern of consideration and use has everything to do with why each president has maintained vast, ready and widely deployed nuclear forces, how it is that each of them has in effect provoked and promoted nuclear proliferation, and with how close the world has actually come on several past occasions to nuclear war. The real risks of the nuclear era, including current and future ones, can only be understood in light of this secret history.

My own official, classified studies of nuclear crises and threats, including the Cuban Missile Crisis (in which I participated, and which came literally within an arms-length of erupting into all-out nuclear war and nuclear winter), made me almost uniquely aware of this pattern. (Nixon’s justified fear that I knew and might reveal his own nuclear threats against North Vietnam led to his creation of the “plumbers” unit in the White House to silence me, which led to his downfall.)

--As I became aware in the Pentagon in the Sixties, unequivocal USG opposition to nuclear proliferation has always been another myth. There has always been, secretly, split opinion on this within the government, with the highest-level view generally prevailing that proliferation to selected friendly states should be secretly accepted or even supported. This has affected proliferation in Israel, India, and Pakistan (even though some other programs, such as Taiwan and South Korea, have been discouraged).

Along with the past and continuing US first-use threats, this selective toleration or encouragement of proliferation has promoted still further proliferation, as in North Korea, earlier in Iraq, and possibly Iran now. More than that, it makes an effective US or worldwide non-proliferation policy virtually unattainable.

This can’t be changed unless and until the US effectively abandons its own reliance on first-use threats, along with the force readiness to carry them out (dismantling its thousands of tactical nuclear weapons) and leads—instead of resisting, as it has until now—a worldwide movement to delegitimize and eliminate threats of first-use of nuclear weapons.

Frontline should expose, for the first time on television, both this hidden US reliance on first-use threats and its bearing on risks of nuclear war, on proliferation, and on the vastly excessive overall US nuclear forces (which are largely structured to back up the credibility of US first-use threats).

In all these matters, I am prepared to contribute by revealing previously-undisclosed details and documents from my official, classified studies.

Wednesday, June 20, 2007

[NOTES for pp. 4-6

Title? A Chronicle of Madness

My engagement with the Bomb

Chronicle of Madness: A Memoir of the Nuclear Era

My Encounters with the Bomb

Chronicle of Madness: My Encounters with the Bomb

A Memoir of the Nuclear Era

Heading for chapter: Revelations (evokes Armageddon: Secret)

Or, Epiphany

Possible epigraph: Nietzsche: "Madness is the exception in individuals, but in groups, parties, nations and epochs it is the rule."

Nietzsche: Whoever fights monsters should take care (see to it?) that in the process they do not become a monster. And when you look into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.

Nietzsche: That man should be liberated from revenge, that to me is the bridge to the highest hopes, a rainbow after many storms.

Paul, 12: Do not repay evil with evil.

What was exposed by the JCS calculation—and especially by their prompt admission of it to the president—was a (spectacular, gross, glaring, fundamental...) *irrationality, madness, insanity* at the heart, soul, organs and fingernails of our nuclear planning and system.

Had this been done by humans? Or by an untended computer? (See the simulation games now run routinely, constantly, by computers: not then). Or an insect-mind? (Reptile brain). Lacking *any* empathy, compassion, fellow-feeling, concern, for human lives or flesh?

(Later, I realized: it is human, universally and fundamentally human, to lack at times and under various conditions any such fellow-feeling or concern for particular large masses of other humans. This is one of the factors underlying the existence of war and its recurrence. And this can rather easily and reliably be manipulated by leaders and groups, turned on or off, by framing or propaganda. What was new here—which showed itself particularly starkly—was the physical scale on which this unconcern, and the destructiveness it permitted, could be expressed in the new thermonuclear era.)

*This machine spelled deliberate doom for our enemies and their population, and doom by “unavoidable” but foretold and “accepted” “side effects” (see doctrine of “double effect”—writ large!) for the populations of our allies and most neutrals in the Northern-Eastern Hemispheres. (A “quarter-sphere”?) But not-- it was *thought*, erroneously, till 1983, with the discovery of nuclear winter—a great danger (from our own attacks) to the Western or Southern Hemispheres. Thus it was thought, wrongly, to threaten/doom at most (or, “only,” as Teller put it repeatedly, as late as 1982) a quarter of the earth’s population.*

In 1961, and for several years, the JCS had possessed a literal Doomsday Machine. They didn’t know that till 1983 (and have evidently not adjusted their plans significantly since that discovery). What they knew then and reported to the president was that they had constructed a “Quarter-Doomsday Machine.” (And it definitely was, as Herman Kahn had feared and as I had discovered—prone to false alarm and unauthorized action.)

Till this moment, I had believed in a fundamental rationality on our side: tempered by loose—even irresponsibly loose—control at the top and at lower levels of command, and possibilities of miscalculations—false signals or readings of signals—at all levels, and accidents. Mad, impulsive, misled individuals might, I had found, set the machine in motion at various levels—contrary to the intentions of designers and commanders. I didn’t worry (as much I should, as I found later) about such instability at the highest levels; the problem, as I saw it, was tighten and improve the control by the JCS and, especially, by the president.

Monday, June 25, 2007

For a number of years, it is as though the problem of nuclear war had disappeared. To a large extent, this has been true since the end of the Cold War, about 1990. (See my MP-II essay). FUNDING has been cut off from the Foundations, which has affected NGOs. PSR has almost dropped the problem from its agenda. Names have been changed, to drop nuclear. Schell's last book, on abolition, sold less than 10,000 copies. Mayhew, in 1974 (?), prior to Schell's *Fate of the Earth and the Freeze*, told me that Simon and Shuster wouldn't publish my nuclear memoir, because it would sell only 1600 copies.

I was warned by my agent, Brockman, in 1997 (?) that "every time you mention the war 'nuclear' [as in, "I've been doing mainly nuclear activism in the last twenty years"] your advance goes down by \$10,000...The publishers are not worried that you would write about this; they're worried that you wouldn't even get on talk shows, for fear of the producers that you would talk about nuclear war."

That began to change somewhat, with a new concern not about all-out war (at all: despite continuing arsenals and alert) but about proliferation: India, Pakistan, then North Korea, then Iraq (!), then Iran. And then, terrorism, with 9-11: used by Bush to build support for attacks on Iraq and Iran (despite his alliance with Pakistan, and now, aid to India, virtually nullifying the NPT wrt NWS not part of the NPT).

And yet: at this moment (and in past generation) nuclear posture of the US and Russia remains the most urgent threat to human survival. It could bring about extinction in the very short run, the mid-term, the long-term. It is virtually unique in this! There never has been, in human experience (stretching back beyond pre-history) a threat like this, to ourselves and most "advanced" species [DEFINE]. It is exactly comparable—though man-made!—to the effect produced by the asteroid that wiped out the dinosaurs and most other species in the last (?) Great Extinction, 60 millions years ago. (Even without a nuclear war or asteroid, humanity seems to be bringing about the Sixth Great Extinction, simply by our effects on the environment and urbanization; but a large nuclear war, against cities, would do this in months.)

[The Human Asteroid] ["Earth, you've got a problem"...as the moment of "impact"—or launch—approaches.] (viz Apollo 13, Houston, we've got a problem. Apollo—the energy process of the sun, and the temperature of its surface, is brought to the earth.) (Apollo: wisdom?)

Moreover, short of the threat to humanity as a whole, or even to all of (northern, perhaps global) urban civilization, there is the threat posed now or soon by nuclear terrorism or small nuclear wars to cities: not all, but some, many. Again, this seems larger than the short-run threat of global warming, or at least, comparable (or, of tsunamis, hurricanes: see Katrina!) (Nagasaki!)

And unlike Katrina, this threat is posed not only by negligence (culpable, criminal) and unconcern, but by deliberate human planning and preparation and intention: as if the hurricane itself were man-made.

Is my current mood of despair, hopelessness (not continuously, but frequently, nowadays) solely due to one or the other of: age, fatigue, experience, burnout, brain chemistry; or to the situation, recent experience?

On the latter:

Bush administration policies, determinedly rushing in the wrong direction, showing no inclination to listen, learn, change;

Palestine: both Israel and Fatah/Hamas.

Iran: including their contribution (now, crackdown on dissent); response to our provocations; understandable incentive to acquire nuclear deterrence. Bush/Cheney/Abrams (Israel?) determination to attack, perhaps exacerbated by low polls and unsuccess in Iraq.

Iraq: determination not only of Bush BUT OF DEMOCRATIC LEADERS to remain in Iraq indefinitely, in bases, with reduced force (unless a draft becomes possible).

The possibility of another 9-11 in next 18 months: perhaps actually launched by AQ in deliberate "false flag" mode to provoke an attack on Iran! (Brzezinski) (What could AQ like better?!)

The prospect, with another 9-11 or a war with Iran (and Iranian reaction) of a New Order in the US: detention camps, clampdown on dissent (no Bill of Rights), surveillance society (East Germany), theocracy? DRAFT (large deployment to Iraq, perhaps Iran), nuclear testing.

Possible FU against Iran; followed by mass proliferation.

No progress on global warming.

There are those who have "faith" that the worst of these eventualities—in particular, human extinction, by human action—will not occur. This can be based not only on a belief in an anthropomorphic God but (Chris Hedges, Huston Smith) in an essentially benevolent universe, compassionate toward humans: "The ark of the universe is long, but it bends toward justice." (MLK, Jr. quoting...?)

I don't believe this. I don't believe we are protected by any external being/force/energy, and certainly not by our own proclivities. No guarantee of survival, let alone, happiness, welfare. (Paul Sawyer, yesterday, suggested that the existence of nuclear weapons—or earlier, the fissionability of U-235—constitutes a (perhaps useful!) “challenge” to humanity. But I feel sure that many humans will fail that challenge (to the detriment of many innocents, if not all humanity and other species) and it only takes a few! (There would be no excuse for a “loving God” to have given us this .45 in a houseful of eight-year-old boys. Sawyer: But we're adults! That's no comfort at all, with U-235 (as I saw in 1944! Adults may handle .45's, up to a point: but not U-235).

(See William Fielding Ogburn, Cultural Lag—which influenced Mr. Patterson)

On the other hand, Sam Harris' God appears to be Reason, Science. That is no basis for Faith, either! It has led directly to our nuclear weapons and posture and policy! (Goya: The sleep of reason breeds monsters. But is this a quote from Blake? And did he mean that the silencing of reason breeds monsters, or that Reason is a kind of sleep, that breeds monsters?! Check on Blake's concept of Urizen.

Certainly, economic rationality, emphasis on coherence, consistency, instrumental relation of means to ends without a critique of ends (standards separate from an individual's pursuit of his happiness) can lead and has led to our present nuclear predicament, as has the uncritical and unrestrained pursuit of Science (Teller: the prophet not only of “unrestrained Science” but of unlimited destructive power!)

George Konrad, Anti-Politics (TR, 6/25/2007): We can aspire to a world in which (preparation for) mass murder is not a leading industry.

SIOP-62 is no “lesser evil”—compared to any action whatever we might take, or any alternative contingency (including—note—our own complete obliteration! Which could, at the limit, be met by a preemptive counterforce attack targeting no cities and using no ground bursts: though, better (or, obligatorily) the FS characteristics of this D-L posture must be avoided [I DIDN'T KNOW THIS IN THE SPRING OF 1961, ASSUMING A SOVIET FS POSTURE AND PERHAPS INTENT!], preferably mutually, with inspection.

The Greatest Evil.

6/25/07 2:52 PM

(after walking and talking with Tom Reifer):

TR points out that (almost?) every FU threat by the US was planned and issued in the context of deterring or responding to Soviet or Chinese (conventional) intervention in “our” half of a divided country (as in South Vietnam), possibly arising out of an uprising against communist rule in “their” half (East Germany, North Korea, Communist China, Castro’s Cuba);

(or, conceivably: Soviet or Chinese conventional response to our intervention in “their” half of a divided country, in support of a local uprising against Communist rule: Germany, China, North Korea (Koreans feared), Cuba—Mongoose!

The Soviets feared that an uprising in East Germany might lead to West German intervention (even against the wishes of the US and NATO). They were in force “forward” in East Germany, not only (a) to suppress such an uprising, but (b) to deter or respond to West German intervention; and (c) to deter US intervention, while (d) deterring US FU of nuclears, since the fighting would be so close to West Germany.

Question: Did the Soviets ever consider the possibility of what the JCS postulated as a likely path to war: the East Germany Army siding with the uprising (the Soviets probably did consider this), and then “backing into” West Germany, challenging the Soviets to “hot pursuit” (which would have triggered the SIOP in 1960-62!)

Did the JCS or President Eisenhower ever consider the possibility (feared by the Soviets) that the US would cross into East Germany to support an uprising? Eisenhower had refrained from that in the case of Hungary, Poland (and later—LBJ—Czechoslovakia. Did he even consider doing otherwise? Probably not. Did the JCS? Did any of them recommend it, or plan for it (as in Cuba I)? If not: the Soviet fear, though plausible, was unfounded, at least as far as US intentions, which were NOT to enter fighting in East Germany (UNLESS a Soviet attack threatened Berlin!)

Likewise, the Soviets might never have intended hot pursuit into West Germany, for fear of risks and nuclear war, even though they could imagine expelling the East German forces into West Germany. (After all, they could live with that). Alternatively, they might have planned that if it came to that, the likelihood of limited war, eventually US FU, would be so great that they should send the forward-based Soviet divisions directly into West Europe in a race for the channel!

But the North Koreans had comparable fears. And of course, the Chinese Communists knew that Chiang wanted to return to the mainland (with US “support”), and might well exploit an uprising on the mainland for this. (Note the many covert raids against the mainland: like 34A! “Provoking” a Chinese attack on Quemoy and Matsu, in 1954 and 1957 (These raids were no more known to the American public, and even to many in the

government, than Mongoose in Cuba or 34A in Vietnam: or the bombing of Iraq in the 90's or the covert operations in Iran right now!)

The North Vietnamese may not have feared an offensive by SVN into NVN even in event of an uprising in the North (or, they may have! Certainly Diem and his successors talked of liberating the North!) But in this case, the US feared strongly North Vietnamese intervention (as did occur! But their forces were introduced covertly) in the South, "in support of a local uprising" against US-GVN rule. Against an overt intervention, (or intervention in North or South by the Chinese) the US relied on FU, throughout the 50's.

Earlier, the US considered FU against a Chinese-aided attack on Dienbienphu (supporting an uprising against French-US rule).

The US fear, in short, was not really about an unprovoked attack by the Soviets or Chinese against an ally of ours: but Soviet or Chinese conventional ground support of an uprising against US in the US-ruled half of a divided country after World War II; or Soviet or Chinese overwhelming conventional response to intervention in the Communist half of a divided country by the US or an ally (West Germany , Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam: and possibly a reversal of alliances by East German forces in the event of an uprising in East Germany), possibly in response to an uprising in the Communist half (Germany, Taiwan, Korea) or perhaps not (Vietnam).

According to Cummings, Eisenhower actually planned the possibility of helping an uprising in North Korea. (And Republican doctrine called for roll-back in China, though Eisenhower had rejected this for Vietnam and Korea).

The exception to this pattern would seem to be: preparation for FU threats or execution in case of Soviet moves into Iran (though in 1980, this possibility was premised on US air-ground intervention in Iran first, during the hostage crisis). Likewise, deterrence or defense of Kuwait against expansion by the Kassim regime in Iraq, 1957. (58?) In 1980, Carter's FU threat was against Soviet expansion of its move into Afghanistan (which followed a US covert intervention against a Soviet regime there: in effect, US support for an uprising against a recently-established Communist regime there, a new addition to the SU empire. (See C-I and Mongoose, aimed at a Soviet "enclave" in the Caribbean.,like West Berlin in Easy Germany).

Berlin itself, the preeminent focus of US FU threats, did not an "uprising" in the Soviet bloc but, comparably, a constant "provocation" and threat to stability inside their bloc: like Quemoy and Matsu, or Taiwan, with respect to China) The US was covertly aiming to roll-back these additions to the SU bloc: Afghanistan and Cuba; in each case provoking Soviet intervention, leading to escalation of the US effort at roll-back and US threats if the Soviets interfered with this.

In short, US FU threats are issued not just when US (or allied: French) troops are threatened with capture or defeat by overwhelming Communist ground strength: Dienbienphu, Khe Sanh, Berlin, Taiwan Straits. They are relied on at all times in the

Cold War, not just in crises, as back-up to US military efforts to hang on (defensively) to regions in the US sphere of hegemonic influence, the US indirect or direct empire: in particular, in divided countries, where Soviet or Chinese or North Vietnamese intervention seems more than possible, precisely because of the possibility of an uprising in their own half of the country or (Vietnam) an uprising in our half, in support of unification.

Thus the necessity of the US (and other NWS) giving up FU. (Above all, the US; explain).

The resistance of the US Establishment to committing to mutual Freeze or disarmament or abolition (or even reductions to minimal deterrence) is based on their rejection of even mutual, let alone unilateral, renunciation of first-use. Mutual abolition or even mutual minimum deterrence—*no matter how reliable and well-inspected*—is unacceptable to the US precisely because it relies on FU to *maintain* its far-flung sphere of hegemony, which includes several halves of divided states on the borders of the Soviet sphere. The goal is defensive, rather than expansionist (on the whole: despite hypothetical consideration of roll-back in certain circumstances, and rhetoric to this effect).

But *what is defended* is not the US or even, fundamentally, the territory of its closest allies (which is little threatened except under special circumstances: not by deliberate Soviet expansionism but in circumstances that might arise from Soviet efforts to maintain its own present sphere, against uprisings against their oppressive rule) but US “interests” in areas distant from either the US or its close allies, a US imperial sphere of hegemonic influence where US indirect rule is no less illegitimate than the Soviets’ in their sphere.

To maintain Berlin (which does not fit the above pattern) or South Vietnam in the ‘50’s, Taiwan, , or Western-dominated Iran (prior to 1978), against local communist conventional, the U.S. had little alternative but to threaten FU.

That was less true of maintaining South Korea in the 50’s after the Armistice, especially as ROK forces built up (according to Vann, this was particularly after 1959). But to quote Reifer, in *Melting the Iceberg: Ending the Cold War in the Korean Peninsula* (Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, 2001), “The Global Significance of Korea’s Cold War Division System and the International Movement for Reconciliation” p. 20:

“The Eisenhower administration’s August 1957 reversal of its Korea policy with the adoption of NSC 5702/2 [is this a BNSP?], highlighted this issue. In this shift, the US approved “US support for a unilateral ROK military initiative in response to a mass uprising, Hbungarian style, in north Korea” (quoted in Cumings, 1997, 478). North Korea’s forward based offensive forces, like the Warsaw Pact, may aim in part at preventing exactly this possibility, albeit by adopting a provocative military posture. US and ROK military planning, training and deployments have also been needlessly

provocative.” [do they, by any chance, practice offensive action into North Korea, in exercises monitored by NK?]

Earlier, TR 19: “Soviet deployment of forward based tanks and troops in Eastern Europe and training Warsaw Pact conventional forces only [sic] in offensive blitzkrieg operations were justified as a counter to NATO’s strategy of basing the defense of Western Europe on threats of nuclear first-use (McCWire, 1987). In reality, these policies also served as crucial supports for the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, ensuring that Warsaw Pact states had no capability to defend against a Soviet invasion, as in 1956 and 1968 (Jones, 1981, 1992). The Soviet posture also carried an implicit warning to the West not to intervene in uprisings in the Soviet empire, lest this trigger a Soviet conventional attack of Western Europe. NATO’s doctrine of reliance on nuclear weapons for defense meant that such an attack risked starting a nuclear World War III, despite the supposed aim of Soviet strategy to prevent this (cf. McCWire, 1987). What’s more, Soviet policy played into the worst fears of Cold Warriors, just as US Cold War policy confirmed the worst fears of the Soviets and their allies.”

George Konrad, Anti-Politics:

103: A third world war would be humanity's absolute crime.

(Who in the world would *not* be, in some (perhaps small) measure responsible for World War III? Who would have done all he or she possibly could to avert it, to make it less probable, to postpone it, to make it impossible? Perhaps a few.

"We are capable of killing one another and we are capable of not killing one another; indeed, we are capable of loving one another. Which we will do is not laid down in our instincts. This perilous freedom is the essence of the human drama." (102)

[Yet: what is "possible" for an addict to do, to move away from his addiction? How much can he be said to have "free will"? What's the way to bet? And yet: there is some element of choice, of will. People do quit.]

"If I knew who was going to die I would also know that every time it is someone who is, in the nature of things, incomparable. —[unique; irreplaceable] Everyone who has a mother knows that every old woman is incomparable." 101

"One person's consciousness cannot substitute for another's, since the other person's life has been different. My history differs from everyone else's. How ridiculously little it is to say of anyone that he was wise, or pious, or a scoundrel, or a killer. There are no words of this sort tht would sum up my nature in it entirety. If there is truth in the assertion that God is always greater—Deus semper jamor—then there is also truth in the assertion that man is also greater. [greater [than any specific, finite formulation, description] For that reason we cannot make any higher moral demand on ourselves than to respect and honor this greatness [this unsummability, this irreducible and inexpressible complexity] and if possible not to kill it."

"History, on the other hand, consists of nothing but [most written history: see below] mutual killing, robbing, deceit, and humiliation; that's the stuff of history. It is a record of the slyest possible commission of acts tht religion and culture consider criminal. Pious talk and crimes to match—that's the kind of hypocrisy that history speaks of

"But is crime the only thing that has happened? It is true that in our chronicles we commemorate wickedness; perhaps we do so because it's relatively uncommon. In a certain village the women often nurse their children, but they very seldom strangle them. History takes no note when a woman feeds her family. Love is more common than nuder, peace is more common than wr. Men beat their wives, but tht's the exception; more often, they kiss them.

"Goodness is all around us, as unnoticed as the earth and the air. Our human reality is woven of cooperation, and violence is the rip in the fabric.103

191: Why not declare that the goal of history is a world order in which there are no concentration camps and never can be any, *in which mass murder is not a key industry. The rejection of terror, the rejection of atomic war*, democracy within and among all social units, contractual relations according to the rules of the game—it is up to us to declare that this is the meaning and goal of history. (ital added)

Daniel Ellsberg
August, 2009

Proposal for a print or television series by investigative journalists
on the hidden dangers of U.S. nuclear weapons policy

The American Doomsday Machine

I learned in the Sixties-- from my classified work as a RAND Corporation researcher and consultant to CINCPAC, the Office of Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the White House on nuclear command and control and nuclear war plans—some of the most sensitive and closely-guarded secrets of U.S. nuclear weapons policies.

I believe these are urgently timely to expose and debate today. Almost surely they still relate to dangerous aspects of nuclear policy not only in the US and Russia, but in all other nuclear weapons states, Pakistan in particular.

I am prepared--by revealing previously-undisclosed specifics and documents from my official, classified studies—to help either print or television journalists expose, by their own investigations and with the aim of stimulating unprecedented Congressional hearings, any or all of the following hidden realities, long held secret from the American public:

I. American planning for a hundred Holocausts. For half a century strategic nuclear forces of the US have been kept operationally ready, on the command of the president (or one of a number of subordinates: see IV below), to kill several hundreds of millions--or more than a billion--people, by simultaneous nuclear attacks on hundreds of cities.

At the end of the Eisenhower era, this was the *only* option offered to the president for engaging in any conflict with Soviet forces, no matter how, where, or by whom it was initiated. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate of the number of deaths resulting directly from executing that plan was some six hundred million killed. A hundred Holocausts.

That estimate was their answer to a question I drafted for President Kennedy to ask them in the spring of 1961. Their calculation was, in retrospect, a gross underestimate, at least by a factor of two, perhaps (with current population) by an order of magnitude (see II below).

Although a mass attack including “urban-industrial centers” is no longer the *only* choice for a National Command Authority—in 1961-62 I helped draft guidance for alternatives to it directed by Secretary of Defense McNamara—that “option” almost certainly remains in the operational readiness plans for the alert force. That should be investigated—by journalists and Congress--and changed.

II. The Doomsday Machines: nuclear winter. Scientific studies and modeling in 1982-84 revealed--and much more definitive modeling in 2004-08 has confirmed-- that if the option described above were executed (by the US, or Russia, or both), clouds of soot and smoke from the simultaneous burning of hundreds of cities would block sunlight for a prolonged period in the northern hemisphere, and possibly around the globe, causing "nuclear winter." An attack in spring or summer would freeze lakes and rivers and destroy all crops, bringing mass starvation and the destruction of civilization in the northern hemisphere and possibly worldwide. It could cause near- or total human extinction.

In 1960, my colleague Herman Kahn at the RAND Corporation imagined a hypothetical Doomsday Machine that would destroy all life on earth if triggered by some undesired event. He presented it as a "thought-experiment," a hypothetical device that offered itself as the "ultimate deterrent" yet was self-evidently undesirable. (Inappropriate; non-optimal: euphemisms are unavoidable: there are no words for it).

What neither Kahn nor anyone else knew at the time was that such a system actually existed. The United States (not yet, the Soviet Union) had constructed it. The U.S. strategic air and naval forces, programmed to execute the then-single war-plan for any conflict with Soviet forces, *were* a potential Doomsday Machine. They still are. Within a few years, the Soviet Union had acquired a comparable capability, which Russia maintains.

Yet discovery of this fact over twenty years later, a quarter-century ago, reportedly led to no change whatever in operational US nuclear planning. Journalists—and Congress-- should investigate the likelihood that this is still, inexcusably, true.

If so, it is not only the American public and Congress that should demand decisive changes in US (and corresponding Russian) plans and readiness; it is the right of every person in every state in the world to make that demand. (That would be true for such plans even without the prospect of nuclear winter.)

This applies not only to operational plans but to force size and structure. The Obama administration is reportedly aiming to reduce, by bilateral agreement the number of operational US and Russian warheads down to 1500 each (from 1700 to 2200), and possibly lower to 1000 each. But 1000 warheads are still capable of causing nuclear winter, the worldwide destruction of civilization and possibly of humanity.

There should not exist on earth—there should never have existed-- *one* "nuclear-winter-capable state," one Doomsday Machine, let alone two, as at present. (If nuclear testing should resume, France and perhaps China would quickly develop multiple warheads for their missiles, becoming the third and fourth states whose leaders were capable of destroying civilization and possibly the human species.)

This points to the urgent necessity of reducing, as quickly as possible, operational nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia to well *below* one thousand total for both (and nailing down a permanent ban on nuclear testing).

Moreover, more recent scientific studies conclude that even a very much smaller nuclear exchange involving as few as one hundred Hiroshima-sized explosions—such as could occur between India and Pakistan—could have prolonged effects on the ozone layer that protects the earth from ultraviolet radiation, with devastating effects on health and crops, as well as climatic effects greater than any in recorded history.

This implies that even the smallest nuclear arsenals—at the level of fifty rather than thousands, for the US and Russia as well as for others-- are larger than can remotely be justified in terms of their possible and likely effects on the world at large.

III. How many fingers on the buttons? The well-known image of the presidential “football”—the briefcase that always accompanies a president containing codes for executing various nuclear options—is meant to convey that only the president can launch nuclear attacks. That is a hoax.

Contrary to public belief, deceptively encouraged by successive American administrations, there have always been a great many American fingers on a number of nuclear buttons, distributed around the world in American nuclear commands.

Every president since Eisenhower has secretly delegated authority to launch nuclear operations to nuclear-capable theater commanders under certain conditions, such as inability to communicate with Washington during a crisis or presidential incapacitation (like Eisenhower’s heart attack and stroke).

(I revealed this—a very closely-held secret even within the government--to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy’s Assistant for National Security, in the first month of his administration. Only recently—after decades of unsuccessful efforts by me to have it investigated by Congress and mainstream media--have documents confirming this for Eisenhower and Kennedy been declassified, still largely unknown to the public.)

It is essential, of course, that it be known to the Russians and others that they cannot paralyze American nuclear retaliation by a single warhead on Washington. (For the same reason, the Russians have made similar arrangements: as have, almost certainly, the Pakistanis and every other nuclear weapons state).

But this delegation has been one of our most sensitively protected secrets from the American people, lest they be, for good reason, concerned that nuclear war might occur by the authorized but mistaken decision of one or another of many commanders below the level of the president. This realistic danger would be in addition to the real and also under-investigated risks (another of my past professional subjects) of false alarms, accidents and unauthorized actions.

Past Congressional hearings have been misled by deceptive official testimony on the existence of delegation. Journalists should seek current answers, both by exploring possible sources and by stimulating new Congressional demands for truthful testimony on how many American fingers are on buttons, whose they are, and what can be known about the probable situation in other nuclear weapons states, in particular Russia, India, North Korea, Israel, and above all, Pakistan.

IV. The inexcusable dangers of US and Russian missile alert posture. Although thousands of nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from operational status (and some dismantled) in the US and Russian arsenals by arms reduction agreements, thousands remain on operational alert, ready for preemptive launch on radar and satellite warning of imminent attack. Such warning could easily be mistaken, with a great many false alarms having already occurred, some coming seriously close to irrevocable, catastrophic decision to launch US or Russian forces.

With the ending of the Cold War a generation ago, the persistence of this danger to humanity is outrageous, intolerably reckless. The urgency of “de-alerting” is widely recognized among defense experts, but political pressure has been lacking to counteract institutional inertia. Investigative journalists could create the public awareness needed to change that.

V. The esoteric lunacy of US-Russian “damage limitation.” Even during the latter half of the Cold War, the insiders’ rationale for these alert forces—and for the nature and scale of our offensive force altogether--was entirely outmoded. Their targets, on each side, were largely military (in addition to the fraction devoted to cities), with the aim of limiting damage to the side that struck first by destroying the other’s offensive weapons preemptively.

But with the multiplication on both sides of hardened and submarine missiles, and with delegation on both sides precluding effective “decapitation,” the achievement of significant damage limitation by preemptive first strike has been a wild fantasy since the mid-Sixties. It has been sustained by nothing other than the special interests of the Services and the military-industrial complexes in both countries in producing and deploying large and continuously “modernized” strategic forces.

(President Obama’s abandonment for this year’s arms negotiations of his earlier aim of a ceiling of one thousand missiles each, in favor of the still more excessive ceiling of 1675 missiles each, undoubtedly reflect the seductive effects of this insiders’ rationale, along with the absurd “imperative” of maintaining an option for ballistic missile defense sites on the borders of Russia, both pressed by these still-powerful interests.)

With the current pressure on government budgets, this is a good time for journalists to expose the myths of “damage limitation” and “preemption” that have-- unknown to the public—provided government insiders and the aerospace industry with an esoteric

rationale —totally divorced from realities for at least forty years -- for the bloated and dangerous nuclear forces.

VI. The hidden history and impact of US first-use threats. It is a widespread misconception that no nuclear weapons have been used since Nagasaki. US presidents have used them dozens of times, in confrontations—in the exact same sense that a gun is being used when it is pointed at someone's head, whether or not the trigger is pulled. It is a myth that the use of nuclear weapons in circumstances other than nuclear attack on the US or its forces has been “unthinkable” in the Oval Office.

On the contrary, every president since Truman has had occasion, usually in secret from the American public, sometimes but not always bluffing, to threaten or to entertain consideration of possible imminent initiation of nuclear attack in a confrontation.

That continues into the present. Only last year, not only the president but every major presidential candidate was emphatically declaring that “all options are on the table” with respect to Iran. (TV interviewer to President Bush: “Does that include nuclear weapons?” Bush: “I said, all options.”) According to leading journalists including Seymour Hersh, high-level sources leaked that Vice President Cheney had directed the readiness of nuclear operations against Iranian underground sites and other targets.

This largely-unknown, long-time pattern of consideration and use has everything to do with why each president has maintained vast, ready and widely deployed nuclear forces, how it is that each of them has in effect provoked and promoted nuclear proliferation, and with how close the world has actually come on several past occasions to nuclear war. The real risks of the nuclear era, including current and future ones, and the current obstacles to reducing these risks, can only be understood in light of this secret history.

My own official, classified studies of nuclear crises and threats, including the Cuban Missile Crisis (in which I participated, and which came literally within an arms-length of erupting into all-out nuclear war and nuclear winter), made me almost uniquely aware of this pattern by the Seventies. (Nixon's justified fear that I knew and might reveal his own nuclear threats against North Vietnam led to his creation of the “plumbers” unit in the White House to silence me, which led to his downfall.) Some of the documents and information I propose to disclose for the first time are on this issue.

VII. The hoax of US “non-proliferation” policy. As I became aware in the Pentagon in the Sixties, unequivocal USG opposition to nuclear proliferation has always been another myth. There has always been, secretly, split opinion on this within the government, with the highest-level view generally prevailing that proliferation to selected friendly states should be secretly accepted or even supported. This has facilitated proliferation in Israel, India, and Pakistan (even though some other programs, such as Taiwan and South Korea, have been discouraged).

Along with the past and continuing US first-use threats, this selective toleration or encouragement of proliferation has promoted still further proliferation in less friendly

states, as in North Korea, earlier in Iraq, and possibly Iran now. More than that, it makes an effective US or worldwide non-proliferation policy virtually unattainable.

This can't be changed unless and until the US effectively abandons its own reliance on first-use threats, along with the force readiness to carry them out (dismantling its thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, and the preemptive land-based missile forces that back them up).

Only then could it lead—instead of resisting, as it has until now—a worldwide movement to delegitimize and eliminate threats of first-use of nuclear weapons. And only thus can incentives to acquire or maintain nuclear forces be eliminated for states now threatened with first-use by the US or others or tempted to imitate the first-use threats of the US and NATO.

In the context of such a US-led movement, accompanied by a radical shift in US nuclear weapons policy, there would be considerable promise in efforts to negotiate a definitive commitment from Iran (and other —effectively inspected—to forego any enrichment of its uranium to weapons-grade or production of nuclear weapons. Without that shift and movement, there is virtually no likelihood of blocking such developments—other than illegal, uncertain and highly dangerous US or Israeli attack.

Journalists should expose, for the first time on television or mainstream print media, both this hidden US reliance on first-use threats and its bearing on risks of nuclear war, on proliferation, and on the vastly excessive overall US nuclear forces (which are largely structured to back up the credibility of US first-use threats).

I am prepared to provide long-withheld and in some cases still-classified data on all of these issues, including striking details on how close we came to nuclear war in the Taiwan Straits (Quemoy) Crisis of 1958 (regarded by insiders as the first intense nuclear crisis) and in the subsequent Cuban Missile Crisis (in which I was a participant, and which I later studied for the government with high-level clearances). Also, on the Eisenhower general war plans, the Kennedy war plans (for which I wrote the official guidance) which provided the framework for all subsequent plans, and on dangers in the nuclear command and control system.

I plan to reveal what I know on these matters in a series of online pieces, in my website and in other sites and blogs (including truthdig.com) starting in the fall of 2009, unless preempted by journalistic interest in investigating and exposing these matters in mainstream press or television. In the interests of the latter prospect, I am prepared to postpone and subordinate my own disclosures and to help along a more dramatic presentation by mainstream journalists, with a wider audience, in any way I can.